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IN THE SUPREME C.QURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent, 
-vs.-
DOX FEDDER, 
Appellant. 
S·TATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7899 
Guilt of the defendant, Don Fedder, is not at issue in 
the case at bar. Appellant bases this app·eal upon pro-
cedural errors which allegedly arose during the trial and 
probation of the defendant. 
On the 27th day of November, 1950, an Information 
was filed in the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District', State of Utah, charging the defendant, Don 
Fedder, with two others, with the crime of violating s:ec-
tion 103-36-12, Utah Code Annotated 1943, a felony. (Tr. 
9-Suppl. Tr. 3, 4). 
On December 4, 1950, defendant entered a plea of 
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"not guilty" to the Information. ( Tr. 10-Suppl. Tr. 5). 
This plea was changed to "guilty" on F'ebruary 28, 1951, 
after which the defendant was incarcerated and the case 
referred to the Probation Department, sentence to be in1~ 
posed March 19th, 1951. (Tr.ll-SuppL Tr. 6). 
March 19th, 1951, trial court, based on the· defend-
ant's plea of guilty, placed the defendant on probation 
with the Adult Probation Department and ordered hlin 
to sign a Probation Agreement. Defendant was also 
ordered to ohey all orders issued by the Probation De-
partment ·during his probation period. The defendant ac-
knowledged and consented in open court to sign the afore-
mentioned agreement. 
Imposition of sentence was continued from March 
19th to April 30th, to August 13th, to November 19th. 
(Suppl.~ Tr. 7, 11) The defendant appearing and pur-
suant to favorable reports from the Probation Depart-
ment, imposition of sentence was- continued each time. 
Further continuances were had from November 19th to 
November 26th, to December 3rd, to D·ecember 17th and 
. December 24, 1951. These continuances were granted by 
the court because the defendant failed to appear as 
ordered. (Suppl. Tr.13, 14, 15, 16) On December 24,1951, 
a bench warrant was issued for the defendant's arrest.· 
(Suppl. ~r. 17) 
On June 2., 1952, James. A. Larson, District Agent 
of the Adult Probation Department filed an affidavit with 
the District Court in which he alleged the defendant had 
violated · the terms of his probation and requested the 
court terminate said probation. (Tr. 20, 21). Based 
2 
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i I 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
upon the affidavit, an Order to Show Caus.e was issued 
whereby defendant "'"as ordered to ap·pear on June 30, 
1952, to sho-\v cause 'vhy his probation should not he 
revoked and sentence imposed. (Tr. 22) 
June 20th, defendant's attorney filed Objections and 
Motion to Quash, Set ~:\.side and Vacate the Order to 
Show Cause. (Tr. 23, 24, 25, 26) Afte~ argument of 
counsel, on June 30th, the motion was denied. Thereupon 
July 3rd "~as set as time for hearing on the Affidavit In 
Reply to Order to Show Cause filed by the defendant. 
('Suppl. Tr. 18, 19, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30) 
On July 3rd, afte~ having heard evidence, the court 
found that defendant had violated the Probation Agree~. 
ment and revoked his Order of Parole and issue:d a 
Bench Warrant for defendant's arrest. (Sup·p·l. Tr. 24-
Tr. 32, 33) The trial was continued until July 7th for 
imposition of sentence at which time the defendant again 
failed to appear. 
On July 14, 1952, the trial court filed the written 
Order.after the aforementioned hearing and stated there-
in that the defendant violated .the terms of his p-robation 
and the trial court proceeded to find the defendant guilty 
of the crime charged. (Tr. 35, 36) 
App~llant asserts, as one of his main arguments, that 
inasmuch as the court failed to specify th~. terms of p·ro-
bation, the court lost jurisdiction ove! the person of the . 
defendant to subsequently find that he had violated his 
probation and to impose sentence. Ap~peilant bases his 
argument on· the ground that the minute entries of said 
court do not reveal the terms and condition~ o~ probation 
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and as a result, appellant asserts that he was not placed 
on probation hut rather was released outright. 
The court's attention is invited in particular to the 
transcript of proceedings of the district court (pages 1 to 
31 inclusive). This transcript of proceedings in the dis-
trict court was filed with this court pursuant to an Order 
obtained by the re·spondent herein, which transcript, 
rather than the minute entries, is the proper record for 
appeal. Said record will be referred to as "Supplemental 
Transcript." 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POIN'T I 
THE TRIAL COURT, AFTER RECEIVING APPEL-
LANT'S PLEA· OF GUI~TY, PROPERLY PLACED DEFEND-
ANT ON PROBATION AND SUSPENDED IMPOSITION OF 
SENTENCE PENDING AN INVESTIGATION BY DISTRICT 
PROBATION AGENT. 
1. There is no requirement that, upon a plea of guilty, judg-
ment be pronounced and sentence imposed before the 
defendant may be placed on probation. 
2. Pronouncement of judgment and sentence may be post-
poned to a day certain where it becomes incidentally 
necessary in the administration of justice or to enable 
the court to better determine proper punishment. 
3. The trial court did not lose jurisdiction in exercising 
its discretion not to pronounce judgment and sentence 
within ten days after receiving defendant's plea of guilty. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENTLY SET FORTH THE 
TERMS, CONDITIONS, AND LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF 
PROBATION. 
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POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT LOSE JURISDICTION 
OF THE DEFENDANT BY POSTPONING THE PRO-
. NOUNCEl\IENT OF SENTENCE NOR DID IT THEREBY 
DIS .. .\.BLE ITSELF TO REVOKE PROBATION AFTER FIND-
ING TIL.-i.T 'I'HE APPELLANT HAD VIOLATED THE TERMS 
THEREO~ WHICH FINDING WAS PROPER . 
. A.RGUJ\IENT 
POIN'T I 
THE TRIAL COURT, AFTER RECEIVING APPEL-
LANT'S PLE ... L\ OF GUILTY, PROPERLY PLACED DEFEND-
ANT ON PROBATION AND SUSPENDED IMPOSITION OF 
SENTE}JCE PENDING AN INVESTIGATION BY DISTRICT 
PROBATION AGENT. 
Appellant, in his brief, challenges the validity and 
enforceability of an order placing a defendant on proba-
tion after he has entered a plea of guilty to the Informa-
tion and before judgment and sentence has been pro-
nounced or there has been what appellant terms a "formal 
adjudication of guilt". 
we agree with appellant that a plea of "guilty" may 
be compared to a jury verdict of guilty to the extent that 
proper motions well founded and taken, if sustained as to· 
proof, might prevent the plea from ever becoming the 
foundation for a judgment and sentence. Following that 
reasoning we go further and contend that under Section 
105-36-17 Utah Code Annotated 1943 (now 77-35-17 Utah 
Code Annotated 1953) the plea of guilty, under prope-r 
circumstances and conditions, may never become, merged 
into the higher right of action of a judgment and sen-
tence; but rather, that plea may be set aside upon the 
satisfactory compliance with the conditions of a p~robation 
5 
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upon which the defendant may he placed after entering 
his plea of guilty. Section 105-36-17 (now 77-35-17) reads 
as follows: 
. "Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any 
crime or offense, if it app-ears compatible with the 
public interest, the court having jurisdiction may 
suspend the imposition or the execution of sen-
tence and may place the defendant on probation 
for such period of time as the court shall deter-
mine. 
The court may subsequently increase or de-
crease the probat1on period, and may revoke or 
modify any condition of probation. While on 
probation, the defendant may. be required to pay, 
in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the 
time of being placed on probation; may be re-
quired to make restitution or reparation to the 
aggrieved party or parties for the actual damage~ 
or losses caused by the offense to which the de-
fendant has pleaded guilty or for which conviction 
was had; and may be required to provide for 
the support of his wife or others for whose sup-
port he may be legally liable. Where it appears 
to the court from the report of the probation agent 
in charge of the defendant, or otherwise, that the 
defendant has complied with the conditions of such 
probation, the court may if it be compatible with 
the public interest either· upon motion of the dis-
trict attorney or of its own motion terminate the 
sentence or set aside the plea of guilty or convic-
tion of the defendant, and dismis'S the action and 
discharge the defendant." 
] t is entirely ·clear under that p~rovision that the. trial 
court may, after receivi~g a plea of guilty, and without 
further proceedings, place a defendant upon probation, 
suspending the imposition of sentence until such time as 
6 
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the tern1 and c.onditions thereof shall haYe been p·roperly 
' ' 
met and fulfilled, or until a breaeh of those tenns and 
conditions require~, in the interest of justice, a revocation 
of the probation thus granted, the imposition of sentence, 
and the cormnitn1ent of defendant to prison. 
1. There is no requirement that, upon a plea of guilty, 
judgment be pronounced and sentence imposed be-
fore the defendant may be placed on probation. 
We cannot agree that, before a defendant· may he 
placed on probation there is a requirement for "formal 
adjudication of guilt". The language of Section 105-36-17 
(77-35-17) clearly indicates that after a plea of guilty 
and prior to the "adjudication of guilt", the prop.er .cir-
cumstances being present, the court ma.y place a defend-
r 
ant on probation. The express wording of the statute 
"Upon a plea of guilty * * * the court h·aving 
jurisdiction may suspend the imposition or the 
execution of sentence and may place the defendant 
on probation * * *'-' (Italics added). 
would permit no other construction than that the court 
may suspend the pronouncement of judgment and sen-
tence for "such period of time a~ the court shall deter-
mine." 
The terms "judgment" and "sentence" have been used 
in the law and in legal writings interchangably, alter-
natively, and synonymously. The term "judgment", when 
used in sp·eaking of the judgment rendered agains~ a de.-
fendant in criminal p·roceedings, means the proceeding 
of declaring ·the defendant's p11!J'bishment. Bugbee vs. 
Boyce, 35 A. 330 66 Vt. 311; the "judgment" is the se!Yir 
t~nce of the court upon the verdict or finding of guilty. 
7 
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People v.s. Markharn, 99 N.Y.S. 109'2, 114 App. Div. 387 
A "judgment" has been described as the "sentence of the 
law". See Words and 'Phrases, Perm. Ed. Vol. 23, Page 
164, 165 and pages 212, 213. 
Apvellant in his brief asserts that there ~ust be a 
for1nal adjudication of guilt before a defendant may be 
placed on probation, and if there is no formal adjudica-
tion of guilt, by a postponement of the imposition of sen-
tence, the court loses jurisdiction of the defendant. The 
appellant cites no authority for the language in page 17 
of his brief which he describes as being the proper me-
chanics for an adjudication of guilt. Appellant cites 
State ex rel Echtle vs. Card and State ex rel SaUee vs. 
Card, 268 Pac. 869. These cases have no application here 
and do not stand, as cited by appellant, for the proposi-
tion that all orders of stay or suspension must be based 
upon a formal adjudication of guilt, but rather those 
cases hold that all orders, to he valid, must be written, not 
orally p~ronounced, thus having no bearing here. 
A construction of the phrase "suspension of imposi-
tion of sentence" is all that is required in order to meet ~ ~ 
app~ellant's contentions in this regard. Words and Phrase'S, 
Perm. Ed., Vol. 20, Page 27·8, defines the phrase, "sus- ! j 
pending imposition of sentence" as follows: "Suspend" ~ ~ 
meaning to seize for a time; hinder f;rom proceeding, 
interrupt; stay; delay; to hold' undetermined. "Impose" 
means to lay on, and "imposition" a placing or laying on; 
"imposition of sentence" the laying on of sentence on de-
fendant or the~ act of sentencing. Kriebel vs. United 
States, C.C.A. Ill. 10 F:ed. 2d 762 and 763. Therefore, 
8 
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to suspend the in1position of sentence is equivalent and 
commensurate to the postpone1nent or arrest of judgment. 
Words and Phrases, Perm. Ed., Vol. 40, Pages 927 and 
928, construes suspension of the sentence as being a sus-
pension of jfidgment which contemplates the postpone-
ment of rendition of judgment. "S.usp,ension of the sen-
. tence" postpones the judgment of the court while the con-
viction and liability following it, together with disabilities, 
remain to become operative upon sentence being given. 
People vs. Stickle, 121 N.W. 49-7, 156 Mich. 557, Huggins 
vs. Caldwell, 3 S.W. 1101, 223 Ky. 468, .Ex parte Dearo 
(California), 214 P. 2d. 585. 
The appellant's argument therefore, that there must 
be a separate adjudication of guilt preceding probation, 
is entirely without merit. 
It should be noted that appellant cites Section 105-
36-17 (now 77-35-17) also, but cites said section p·rior to 
its amendment We respectfully submit that as a result, 
all appellant's. argument based thereunder is defective 
and lacks any force whatsoe.ver, because the subsequent 
amendment changed the statute completely with respect 
to the instant facts.. The· amendment of this statute 
brought about several major changes which, when com-
pared with the statute prior to its amendment, are con-
trolling in the case at bar. Prior to the amendment and 
as cited hy appellant, the statute allowed the invocation 
· of probation by the court: 
Upon conviction of any crime or offense * * *. 
After the amendment, probation could be invoked by 
the court: 
9 
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Upon a plea of guilty or conviction of any 
crime or offense* * * (Italics added). 
Further, the amendment was supplemented with ·the fol-
lowing language not pTesent in the statute prior to 
amendment and as cited by appellant: 
* * * Where it appears to the court from the 
probation agent in charge of the defendant or 
otherwise that the defendant has complied with 
the conditions of such probation, the court may, 
if it be ·compatible with the public interest, either 
upon motion of the District Attorney, or of it::, 
own motion, terminate the sentence or set aside 
the plea of guilty or conviction of thH defendant 
and dismiss the action and discharge the defend-
ant. 
Prior to amendment, the sole enabling condition to 
the imposition of probation upon a defendant was "upon 
conviction of any crime or offense * * * ." Under the 
amended section, probation may be invoked upon a plea 
of guilty or conviction, and by adding the foHowing 
1natter to the section : 
* * * [after successful probationary period] 
the court may * * * (1) termilnate the sentence or 
(2) set aside the plea o.f guilty. 
the legislature has provided correlative means of expung-
ing the record of defendant's guilt if he stands (1) guilty 
by conviction, judgment, and sentence or (2) guilty by 
plea. 
By providing those two avenues of expurgating the 
record as to a defendant's guilt and removing the disa-
bilities incident to his guilt, the .legislature, in amend-
ing the statute;has clearly evidenced itsintent to allow 
10 
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courts the discretion of formally passing judgment on 
defendant and suspending the e:recution thereof or, in 
the alternative, to suspend the proceed·i.ng for the judg-
ment and sentence of defendant by not applying to the 
finding of guilt the adjudication and sentence following 
that finding. 
It is definite and certain under Section 105-36-17 
~77-35-17) that judg1nent and sentence is not a condition 
precedent to probation. 
2. Pronouncement of judgment and sentence may be 
postponed to a day certain where it beco1nes inci- -
dentally necessary in the administration of justice 
or to enable the court to better deter1nine proper 
punishment. 
The authorities are ample in sup·port of the propo-
sition that, the administration of justice requiring it, 
pronouncement of sentence may be postponed beyond 
the number of days fixed by a regulatory statute for 
procedure. Appellant contends that the trial court failed 
to comply with S-ection 105-36-1 (now 77-35-1) 
After a plea or verdict of guilty, or after a 
verdict against the defendant on a plea of a for-
mer conViction or acquittal or once in jeop,ardy, 
if the judgment is not arrested or a new trial 
granted, the court must appoint a time for pro-
nouncing judgment, which must be at least two 
days and not more than ten days after the verdict. 
and in failing so to do, lost the power and jurisdiction to 
adjudicate the gu_ilt and sentence, and p·redicate upon that 
adjudication an orde~ for probation. Appellant asserts 
the more serious consequence of entirely lo'Sing jurisdic-· 
tion over the appellant for all p-urposes. The question of 
- 11 
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the necessity of an order for probation being based upon 
judgment of guilt or sentence has been treated under sub-· 
heading 1 in the argument of this point. Many of the 
conside·rations here are the same. 
Upon the premises that adjudication of guilt need 
not precede an order for probation, and that one of the 
compelling reasons for that rule is to mote expeditiously 
erase the finding of guilt after a defendant responds with 
satisfaction to probation, then it would clearly follow that 
there would be no need to enter the judgment and sen-
tence formally during the investigatory and supervisory 
period. · If the subject of probation is found unfit for, or · 
fails to respond satisfactorily to, the probation so order-
ed, then, upon the happening of that, the condition subse-
quent, would be the proper time to impress upon the re-
cord the judgment and imposition of sentence. 
However, upon grounds much stronger and yet 
wholly unrelated to the foregoing considerations, th(~ 
courts have been declared to have the authority to sus-
pend . or postpone pronouncement of judgment inde-
finitely and, a fortiori, to a day certain. In Ellerbrake vs. 
Kmg, 116 F:ed. 2d 168, the imposing of sentence eight 
months after the defendant pleaded guilty was within the 
discretion of the·court when it was deemed advisable to 
inve-stigate the surrounding circumstances in order to ob-
. tain information as to the p·rincipals in a series of inter-
state freight thefts. The Circuit Court of Appe.als in 
holding that the District Court was veste·d with powe-r to 
suspend imposition of sentence indefinitely without losing 
jurisdiction said: 
12 
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Although the Rules of l)ractice and Procedure 
in Criminal Cases promulgated by· the Supreme 
Court of the United States on May 7, 1934, re-
quiring that sentence be imposed without delay 
* * * do not affect this proceeding [as ha:ving been 
concluded in the District Court p·rior to that 
promulgation]. Even under those rules an ex-
ception is noted 'vhere there should be an investi-
gation in the interest of justice before sentence is 
in1posed. 
That case is infinitely· strong in derogation of appellant's 
contention, for in the instant case the continuances and 
attending investigations were solely for· the benefit and 
behoof of, and not for the purp·ose of finding aggra:vated 
charges against the appellant. He may not now complain 
of the continuance which was in no way p·rejudicial, but 
contrarily, beneficial to himself. In Hayden: vs. W ard:en 
United States Penitentiary, McNeil Island, 124 Fed. 2.d, 
514, the facts were almost identical to those in this case. 
The defendant there was indicted, and on March 26, 1934, 
entered a plea of guilty, at which tin1e a motion for p·ro-
bation was filed. The Federal District Court granted a 
continuance to April 26th and thereafter granted further 
continuances. The defendant, while free on his recogni-
zance, was apprehended for commission of another crime. 
On August 6th he was sentenced by the F'ederal District 
Court on the eha.rges·contained in the original indictment. 
On appe·al the Circuit Court held, a.s against the conten-
tion that the District Court had no p·orwer to postpone 
imposition of sentence, that 'Since the postponements 
were for continuances for a definite time that contention 
was not well taken. 
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. In Gillespie vs. Walker, 296 Fed. 330, the Circuit 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit said: 
Federal Courts, as compared with what has 
heen the invariable custom since the establishment 
of the present judicial system, had been· greatly 
·restricted in their action on the subject of sus-
pending sentences and postponing the rendition of 
their judgments and the execution of their sen-
tences* *. * (Citing cases) with a view of paroling 
or pardoning an accused; they may neverthel~ss 
do so where it becomes incidentally necessary in 
the administration of justice, * * * for a period 
during the term at which the case is tried, . or to 
a fixed day or days during the next term of court. 
Such is the rule in the F'ederal Courts. 
3. The trial court did not lose jurisdiction in exercising 
its discretion not to pronounce judgment and sen-
tence within ten days after receiving defendant's 
plea of guilty. 
The arguments here are similar to those contained 
under sub-heading 2 of this point. However, there is a 
line of uncontradicted authority holding that the regU-
latory statute p·roviding the time within which sentence 
shall be pronounced is not mandatory but merely sets out 
the procedure for prompt action. Ex parte Hardemoo, 
36 Atl. 213, .131 _N.J.L. 257, construes the New Jersey 
statute which reads : 
It shall he the duty of the trial court to im-
pose sentence upon defendant within forty-five 
days after such defendant shall have been con-
victed of a crime. 
The court said that although it is a p·resumption that the 
. word "shall" is imperative and not directory, however, 
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in this instance, it is n1erely set out as a procedure for · 
prompt action not depriving the court of its di~cretion 
nor occasioning the loss of jurisdiction over the defend-
ant's person if not strictly complied with. 
In Williatns vs. State, 152 A. 775 9 N.J. Misc. 66, 
sentence 'vas not imposed within the statutory period 
as prescribed. The court there said : 
It is argued that the affect of this le·gislative 
enactinent ·is to require the court to impose sen-
tence within thirty days after rendition of verdict, 
and that although the defendant in this c~se was 
seeking to have his conviction set aside, the court 
must impose sentence 'vithin the time required by 
law, although it \vas considering the matters in 
regard to defendant's motion and thereby lost its 
power to impose sentence. Thus, the defendant 
could, by trick, defeat the state of its remedy. The 
court has wide discretionary power in pe~rforming 
the duty of imposing sentence in criminal cases. 
and went on to hold that the defendant's contention was 
untenable. In 13oykin vs. State, 190 Pac. 2d, 471, the 
· court held that where a court in the beginning of a case 
has jurisdiction of the subject matter and person of 
defendant, there is a presumption of law that such juris-
diction continues and the.burden is on the defendant to 
show that the court had lost jurisdiction to pronounce 
judgment and sentence and that the trial court may delay 
pronouncement of judgment for the p~urpose of deter-
mining motions for new trial, in arre~st of judgment,, or 
.for other causes. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
POINT II 
TI-IE TRIAL COURT SUFFICIENTLY SET FORTH TH~ 
'l,ERMS, CONDITIONS, AND LENGTH OF THE PERIOD OF' 
PROBATION. 
Appe~llant asserts that inasmuch as the court failed 
to spe·cify the terms of probation, its lost jurisdiction 
over the person of the defendant to subsequently find 
that he had violated his probation. On March 19, 1951, 
the trial court, after receiving a plea of guilty, placed 
the defendant on probation and ordered the defendant 
to sign a probation agreement and to obey all orders made 
by the Probation Department (Suppl. Tr. 7). At that time 
the defendant was asked by the court whether he was will-
ing to accept and do those things and he answered in the 
affirmative (Suppl. Tr. p. 7). Pursuant to the court's 
Order, a p·rohation agreement was executed by ~he de-
fendant on that date, which agreement specifically sets 
forth the terms and conditions of the probation. This 
agreement was offered and accepted by the trial court as 
the "State's Exhibit A" and reads as follows: 
States Ex. A 
AGREEMENT 
Date March 19, 51 
Upon my release I agree to accept the follow-
ing terms and conditions: 
To make regular reports to the Agent in 
charge by the fifth of each and every month, or 
more often if requested to do so. 
Not to change iny place of residence nor to 
leave the bounds of this State or any other 'State 
in ,vhich I am permitted to live, nor to change my 
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place of employ1uent \Yithout first obtaining per-
Inis.sion from the Agent in charge. 
Not to drink u~hi.skey, beer, gin, win.e, or other 
intoxica.ting bez,era.ges; or frequent places where 
the foregoing are sold; a·nd not to ~tse na.rcotic 
d rztgs or 11za rij~tana. 
Not to associate ·with any p·erson, or persons 
of bad repute. · 
Not to have on my person, at any time, deadly, 
dangerous, or concealed weapons. · 
To obey allla"~s, and refrain from all ille·gal 
transactions. 
If I am permitted to leave the State of Utah 
I will report to the proper officials immediately 
upon arrival at my destination, and will notify 
the Utah Office of my arrival. 
I do solemnly promise and agree to abide by 
the foregoing conditions; and hereby acknowledge 
that my failure to comply with any of them may be 
considered a violation of my parole, p·roba.tion 
for which I am subject to be returned as a parole, 
probation violator. 
Signed (s) Donald Fedder 
Street N·o. 3935 Evelyn Drive 
City Ogden, Utah 
State Utah 
Respondent submits that the trial court defined the 
terms of probation by ordering the defendant to exe·cute 
a probation agreement and obey the orders of the Proba-
tion D-ep-artment, thereby fully. complying with the pro-
bation statute. The signature of the defendant on the 
probation agreement executed pursuant to the court's 
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Order and the defendant's acceptance in open court of 
the terms of probation is cohclusive proof, sufficient to 
offset the. arguments of the appellant. 
Section 105-36-17 ·(77-35-17) provides that the court 
may place a defendant on probation for such period of 
time as .the co:urt shall determine. It is respectfully sub-
mitted that in this instance the court granted the con-
tinuances to ap·pellant in order to fully investigate hicl 
. eligibility for probation, and in so doing, gave considera-
tion to the possibility of the ~ppellant's full rehabilitation 
within a short period of time .. This i.s evidenced by the 
trial court's statement (Suppl. Tr. Page 7 and 8): 
Don Fedder's case is continued to April 30th 
for the imposition of sentence, and he is in your 
jurisdiction, (Mr. James A. Larson of the Proba-
tion Department) to qecide whether he is to be 
held longer or turned loose. 
and as evidenced by the Supplemental Transcript, Page 
11: 
THE COURT: "How long do you 'vant it 
continued to~" 
MR. LARSON: (District Probation Agent) 
"Oh, I think probably until August 13th." 
THE COURT: "Alright then, this case is con-
tinued for imposition of sentence to August 13, 
1951." 
Thereafter, all continuances were occasioned by the ap-
pellant's failure to appear within the time set by the 
court. It is clear that the terms of the probation, both 
with respect to the pe·rformance of things required in the 
probation agreement, and as to the length of the time of 
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probation, as stated in terms of continuanc~s during the 
investigatory period, were definite and certain so as to 
fully apprise the appellant of his obligations. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID. NOT· LOSE JURISDICTION 
OF THE DEFENDANT BY POSTPONING THE PRO-
NOUNCEMENT OF SENTENCE NOR DID IT . THEREBY 
DISABLE 'ITSELF TO REVOKE PROBATION AFTER FIND-
ING THAT THE APPELLANT HAD VIOLATED THE TERMS 
THEREOF:, WHICH FINDING WAS PROPER. 
Williams vs. Harris, Warden 106 Utah 387, 149 P. 
2d 640, is a case on all fours with the facts of the case 
before us. In that case the defendant, one of four in-
formed against, entered a plea· of guilty in the Third 
District Court, on December 12, 1932, and the court then 
stated: 
Well, the court will suspend the imposition 
of sentence. in the case of the four of you, who have 
entered a plea of guilty, until Monday, F·ebruary 
6th, 1933, at which time you will report back here, 
or Mr. Childs (the probation agent) can report 
for you, as . to your· conduct. I will place you in 
custody· of Mr. Childs and it is up to you gentle-
men to straighten up. If you don't straighten out 
you will hav~ to come in and be sent to the p·eni-
tentiary, where they will straight~n .you out. 
On February 6, 1933, the defendant ap·peared in court 
with Mr. Childs and the latte·r made a favorable report 
regarding .the hoy's conduct. At this time the District 
Attorney stated to the court: "I do not want your Honor 
to lose jurisdiction of the boys." The court then made 
another order suspending imposition of senten·ce until 
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April 24, 1933 and on that date made a similar order. 
, 
Several of these were made from a definite date to a 
definite date. On October 22, 1933, defendant was 
brought before the Judge who had made the previous 
orders, who asked defendant regarding his plea to the 
charge of burglary and if he had not been sentenced to 
the Utah State Prison recently for a crime committed in 
Utah County while under the court's order of probation. 
Defendant admitted that this was correct. The Judge 
then sentenced defendant to be imprisoned for a tern1 
of not less than one nor more than twenty years. 
This court, after considering the decisions of People 
vs. Blackburn, 6 Utah 347, 23 P. 759, and In Re Flint, 
25 Utah 338, 71 P. 531, so he~avily· relied upon by appel-
lants herein, and which cases were decided long before 
the enactment of the present statute (105-36-17) (now 
77-35-17) stated: 
It is apparent that 105-36-17 gives the court 
much greater latitude and power in suspending 
imposition of sentence than was previously had. 
* * * The purpose of this section is clearly refor-
matory. * * * We are of the opinion that the 
court purposely continued suspension of sentence 
from a day certain to a day certain. * * * We are 
of the opinion the trial court acted within the 
powers granted by the statute, and that it had 
jurisdiction to pronounce sentence to the State 
Prison as was done. 
In deciding the Williams case, this court affirmed 
the theory now adopted by this writer, and expressly 
ruled, point by point, against the arguments now urged 
again by this appellant. First, that the issues in the 
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Flint and Blackburn cases, regularly cited in ap·pellant's 
brief, have long since becon1e moot by the enactment of 
a statute expressly authorizing courts· to susp·end the 
imposition of sentence and grant probation, a prerogative 
not vested in the courts at the time of those two decisions, 
the absence of '\Yhich moved the Utah Supreme Court 
to invalidate proceedings in which the-re ha:d been a 
palpable attempt to exercise a p·ower not theretofore 
granted trial judges. Second, the facts surrounding the 
granting of successive continuances, and the form, sub-
stance, and ter1ns of the orders p·roviding for those con-
tinuances being in the Williams case substantially iden-
tical with the continuances and the 'form, substance, and 
terrrr.s of the orders for continuance in the case now con-
sidered, this court approved and affirmed those proceed- · 
ings. T.hird, this court approved and ratified the imp·o~ 
sition of terms and conditions of probation of a much 
more indefinite character, stated. with less p·articularity 
than the terms and conditions imposed hy the trial court 
in the instant case. At 149 Pacific 2nd, page 642 [8], 'l~R\'"\-z.ecl · 
this court F . t rtct a those terms impo'Sed upon Win~~.'YY)~: 
We do not believe that the judge when he 
placed the boys in the custody of M.r. Childs (the 
probation ""agent) eX}>ected the time fixed then to 
be a fUll period of probation. The trial judge 
was carefUlly feeling his way with these boy8. 
l-Ie was endeavoring to save the youths from the 
stigma of prison. From what was said and done, 
we must conclude that this appellant and the 
other boys were released from time· to time under 
the condition that they straighten up, that they 
do not violate the law. * * * We are of the opinion 
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that the court purposefully continued suspension 
of ~entence from a day certain to· a day certain 
· * * *. We are of the opinion the trial court acted 
within the powers granted by the statute (103-36-
17) and that it had jurisdiction to pronounce sen-
tence to the State Prison as was done. (Ernphasis 
added). 
It is respectfully submitted that the terms and con-
ditions ~et out by the trial court in the case at bar (Suppl. 
Tr. p. 7) were more definite, particular, and better cal-
culated to apprise appellant of what was incumbent upon 
him to maintain imposition of sentence in suspension. 
The probation agreement signed by appellant (State's 
Exhibit "A") implemented the oral instructions . ..c\.s to 
the length of the probation period, these term~ were at 
least commensurate to those in the Williams case. The 
record here shows uncontrovertibly that all continuances 
wer~ from a day certain to a day certain. That there 
were no laches on the part of the state operating to 
prejudice appellant, entitling him to believe his liberty 
was not in jeopardy if he violated any stated condition'S. 
It is submitted that weaker facts in the Williams case 
gave rise to a decision which should control the instant, 
stronger case. 
All other proceedings in the William'S case vvere 
similar to those here. All things that appeared to be 
irregularities at first blush in the case at bar, and 
grasp.ed by appellant in. his attempt to deprive the trial 
court of jurisdiction, were treated in the Williams case 
with a resultant affirmance, ratification, and declaration 
of the regularity thereof: The abrsence of a sentencing 
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of the defendants-referred to by appellant as "judg.:-
ment of guilt;" the continuances of the respective cases 
from fixed days to fixed days; the question of the suffi-
ciency, definiteness, and particularity of the terms and 
conditions of the probation; and principally, the p-ower 
under the 'Statute granting to a trial court the wide. 
discretion .in suspending the . in1position of sentence. 
The inescapable result, respondent submits, is that the 
Williams case, in June, 1944, effectively concluded all of 
the is'Sues no'v- raised and urged upon the same court by 
appellail t. 
Appellant raises a point in his reference to 
In Re Grove, 43 Idaho 775, 254 Pac. 519 
worthy of passing corllment. In his quotation from the 
case on page 34 of appellant's brief, there appears the 
following: 
The court did not * * * prescribe any terms 
or any ti1ne for withholding judgment, but un~ 
conditionally released the defendant from custody 
and indefinitely withheld the p·ronouncement of 
judgment. * * * · 
It immediately appea~ that this case presents. the 
identical problem disposed of in the case of State vs. 
Zolantakis, 70 Utah 569, 259 Pac. 1044, the overrulin@; 
of which by subsequent decisions (Follett vs. Severson, 
22·5 Pac. 2d lt16 ; Demmick vs. Harris, ·.m Pac. 2d 170) 
has been seriously considered by thitg court. As it 
remains on our books, however, that case only holds, 
insofar as is material here, that if the probation is one 
wit.hout any p!fescribed terms ~)r conditions, and for an 
indefinite time, it is a probation upon "good behavior,'' 
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and in order to revoke the same and to dep.rive the 
parolee or probationer of his liberty, he must be given 
an opportunity to be heard and to cross examine at a 
hearing appointed· for the purpose of revoking his lib-
erty. That segment of the case becomes immaterial here, 
even, e'Specially when it appears that .the defendant was 
given notice, of a hearing upon an order to show cause 
why his probation should not he revoked, sufficient to 
apprise him of the possible consequences thereof, and 
adequate enough to enable him to enter a gene·ral appear-
ance in that proceeding by procuring counsel who repre-
sented him there, and by filing an affidavit sup:porting 
a motion to qua'Sh, set aside, and vacate the or4er. ( Tr. 
p. 23-30, Suppl. Tr. p.l8). 
·Appellant raise'S, but neither argues nor cites au-
thority for, his point number II, as'Signing as error the 
finding of the court that appellant violated probation. 
In State vs. Bo~JWa, 106 Utah 55·3, 150 P. 2d 970, 
this court held: 
A defendant out of prison on probation is 
accorded due process of law by the following steps 
* * *: (1) the filing of a verified statement or an 
affidavit in the case setting forth facts which 'Show 
a violation of the terms of p·robation [fully met, 
Tr. 20, 21] (2) the citation thereon requiring the 
defendant to appear and show cause why proba-
tion should not be revoked, apprising defendant of 
the grounds upon which revocation is sought, and 
specifying a proper time for hearing. (3) a hear-
ing before the court on the question of violation 
of some term or condition or probation, at which 
the. defendant ha'S the opportunity to cross exam-
24 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ine 'vitnesses against hi1n and. also to present evi-
dence to refute the claimed violation of the condi-
tions. of probation [Tr. p. 34, Suppl. Tr. pp. 20-31, 
sho"'"ing the hearing at which appellant generally 
appeared, filing his affidavit in answer ( Sup·pl. Tr. 
:26-30) and "Tas represented by counsel] ( 4) a 
determination of the question, followed by entry 
of an a.propria.te order [Tr. pp. 35, 36]. 
Tho~e requirements were re-affinned in substance in 
Christiansen v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P. 2d 314. There 
clearly was no procedural error in the proceedings upon 
which the order was based. The evidence p·resented by 
the probation agent both in his affidavit and upon the 
hearing, uncontroverted, was sufficient upon which to. 
base the trial court's finding. (Tr. p·p. 20, 2'1, Sup·pl. Tr. 
20-31) 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent respectfully submits that all things and 
conditions required to be done, both in acquiring and· 
maintaining jurisdiction over the subject matter and the 
person of the appellant, and in effectively providing a 
proper and enforceable probation, have been had, done, 
and met by the trial court. That the trial court has com-
mitted no error, nor has it deprived itself of the p:ower 
and prerogative to sentence the app·ellant for the crime 
to "\vhich he ha'S entered a plea of guilty. That the defend-
ant is subject to the jurisdiction of the court to answer 
to the charges contained in the information filed in 
this case, and that no part thereof has lapsed, abated, 
or been lost. That the court .committed no error in fail-
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mg to quash, vacate,· or set aside the order to show 
cau'Se, or in finding that there. was no cause for which 
the probation ought not to be revoked, and conunitted 
no error in revoking the probation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
.·· ·• 
E. R. CALLISTER 
A. tt-orney General 
KEN CHAMBERLAIN 
Assistant A.·ttorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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